Brunei Anachronism
Brunei is often seen as a political anachronism in a region in which democratic institutions of government prevail.
Regime Legitimacy
Political Past and Future of Brunei
By Naimah Talib ( New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies)
As the only ruling monarchy in Southeast Asia, the Sultanate of Brunei is often seen as a political anachronism in a region in which democratic institutions of government prevail. Independence, gained from Britain in 1984, did not result in the institution of representative government, but in effect led to the consolidation of the monarchical system of government (Singh 1988: 67).
Its present head of state, Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah, is the 29th ruler of a dynasty which has reigned in Brunei since the fourteenth century. The early Brunei Empire reached its zenith from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, when it exercised suzerainty over much of Borneo and the southern tip of the Philippine archipelago. Under the fifth Sultan, Bolkiah (1473-1521), Brunei was especially powerful and even managed to briefly capture Manila.
Its territorial domain and influence was gradually whittled down through the centuries, and it has been suggested that if not for British colonial intervention, the Sultanate would be lost to oblivion (Horton 1984). In 1839, the English adventurer, James Brooke, arrived in Borneo and gained control over territory in northwest Borneo as a reward for putting down a rebellion in Sarawak. Brooke, who styled himself “Rajah” of Sarawak, soon expanded his territorial control.
Soon after, in 1878, on the northeast coast of Borneo, the British North Borneo Company established a foothold and was similarly encroaching on territory tenuously held by the Brunei Sultanate. The arrival of western powers in the region affected the traditional trading patterns and decimated the economic base of the Sultanate. Brunei became a British Protectorate state in 1888, and had the British not established a residency in 1906, it is very likely that Brunei would have been absorbed by Sarawak.
From 1906 to 1959, except for the short period under Japanese occupation during the Second World War, Brunei was administered by the British under a Residency system. The Sultanate did not lose complete sovereignty especially on matters relating to religion and local custom, but executive authority was held by a succession of British Residents (Horton 1984).
Internal self-government was acquired in 1959, and as a result, executive power was extended to the Sultan. A new constitution was promulgated in 1959 and Brunei assumed full internal sovereignty in 1971 (Saunders 1994: 163).
An attempt to introduce a partially elected legislative body as set down under the constitution was abandoned after the opposition political party, Partai Rakyat Brunei, launched an unsuccessful revolt in 1962. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brunei strongly resisted British pressure to amalgamate with its neighbours, first in a British Borneo Federation and later, in the new state of Malaysia.
In 1979, Brunei and Britain signed a new treaty, transferring powers over defence and foreign affairs to Brunei and this paved the way for full independence in 1984. The Sultanate comprises two territorial enclaves of some 5,769 square kilometres in total, accessible from one another only by water and surrounded on the landward side by the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Its population is estimated at around 344,500 (July 2001), of whom 67 per cent are Malays, who dominate the political and bureaucratic life of the Sultanate (The World Factbook 2001).
Ethnic Chinese, most of whom are stateless, make up around 15 per cent, while indigenous non-Muslims constitute 6 per cent of the population. According to a 1991 estimate, temporary residents make up 41% of the country’s labour force (The World Factbook 2001). The country’s fortunes are closely tied with abundant gas and oil reserves, which initially funded its overseas investments.
In 2000, the Sultanate had one of the highest average per capita income in Asia at US$17,600, and has instituted a comprehensive system of social welfare programmes unique to the region. Free education and health care, guaranteed pensions as well as other benefits are provided on a generous basis to its citizens (Government of Brunei Darussalam, 2002). This paper examines how the Brunei monarchy legitimizes its rule in a country which is sometimes regarded as an anomaly. What are the sources of regime legitimacy that are available to an absolute monarchy which clearly is determined to perpetuate its own existence? Before discussing the various alternatives, it would be useful to look more closely at the nature of the modern Brunei polity.
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Islamic Authority and the State
By Dominik M. Muller ( KyoTo Review)
To a regionally unparalleled extent, political Islamisation in Brunei Darussalam is the exclusive domain of the state. Brunei’s religious bureaucracy maintains an absolute monopoly over Islam-related public communication. No organized secularist or Islamist opposition group has ever openly challenged the post-colonial government’s religious stance. Islamic policy-making takes place solely among state actors, and behind closed doors. Non-state Islamic organizations, independent religious scholars (ulama), or “uncontrolled” Islamic publications, are publicly non-existent. Bruneian ulama are, by definition, civil servants.
In the declaration of Independence in 1984, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah proclaimed that Brunei shall be forever a sovereign, democratic and independent Malay, Muslim Monarchy upon the teachings of (Sunni) Islam . He considers Brunei a “non-secular” state. The notion of being “democratic” is debatable, as Brunei never had general elections, has no parliament, no organized opposition, and is governed by a cabinet appointed by the Sultan.
He holds full executive powers, constitutionally “can do no wrong” (Article 84B), and is Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs and Trade, commander of the police and army, “head of the official religion” (Article 3(2)), i.e. Islam, and considered “Allah’s vice-regent on earth” (khalifah), and the “leader of believers” (ulil amri).
In 2004, a Legislative Council (LegCo) was re-established after its predecessor was dissolved in 1983. Some view it as “window dressing”, considering its largely appointed character and lack of powers.
Others see it as a controlled step towards a new political culture of public participation. No such culture has existed since a short-lived rebellion in 1962, followed by decades of emergency rule. Members of the public can now bring up concerns to LegCo delegates, who assemble annually. The Council also “approves” government budgets.
Brunei’s official national ideology, “Malay Islamic Monarchy” (Melayu Islam Beraja, MIB), is of utmost political importance. It privileges Malay ethnicity (M), Islam (I), and the monarchy (B) as the core of national identity. In response to criticisms that MIB is “invented tradition”, Bruneian scholars – who are obliged to promote MIB – acknowledge the acronym’s invention but insist that it reflects the essence of centuries-old “Bruneian culture” (Mohd Zain 1996:45; Müller 2015:315).
MIB has been increasingly institutionalized. An MIB Concept Committee began its work in 1986 and was later transformed into the MIB Supreme Council. In 1990, the government established the Academy of Brunei Studies (APB), based at University of Brunei Darussalam, which hosts the MIB Supreme Council’s secretariat. The APB is the key force for MIB-knowledge production. It propagates MIB at three levels: schools, higher education, and the public. MIB classes in schools, colleges and universities are obligatory; no citizen can graduate without passing the MIB modules. News media constantly refer to MIB, and public events are typically framed as serving MIB. Art or poetry competitions, for example, follow MIB-patriotic terms, and students abroad are instructed to “uphold the values of MIB”. The centrality of MIB to good citizenship and the norms of public expression has been deeply internalized in society and whatever opinions individuals have about MIB remains concealed in “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990). Even MIB officers, however, share everyday jokes reinventing the acronym’s meaning. More serious questionings of the concept occur on cyberspace (Müller 2010:157), albeit very rarely.
Legal and Institutional Means of MIB-Islamic Governance
Brunei’s history of Islamization policies is a history of cementing the state’s monopoly to define the contents and red lines of Islamic doctrine and practice. Organized “Islamist mobilization” – this special issue’s theme – rarely exists, at least not in oppositional or non-state contexts, although individuals with sympathies for foreign militias (e.g. Jamaah Islamiyah) and members of non-violent but illegal Muslim groups (e.g. the Malaysian al-Arqam) have been arrested in the past.
If “Islamism” refers to a political ideology and social project aspiring to utilize the state and its legal apparatus for a top-down Islamization of society, alongside educational efforts, the Bruneian state itself has been passionately engaging in “Islamist” mobilization since the 1980s.
Historically, an Islamically inspired legal code existed in pre-colonial Brunei, alongside customary normativities. During the British residency (1906–1959, protectorate since 1888), colonial officers advised the sultans on “modernizing” religious administration, aiming at a systematic institutionalization and codification following British understandings of state-building and legalistic thinking. This resulted in a series of legal codes, beginning with the Mohammedan Laws Enactment of 1912, and the establishment of new institutions. Notwithstanding this diversification, the Islamic legal sphere became limited to family and personal status law, although some religiously defined criminal offenses were punishable as well. The Sultans’ powers became reduced to religious and customary matters, but they used these spheres to consolidate their position and symbolic power. In 1959, Brunei became largely autonomous in domestic affairs. The Constitution of 1959 emphasized the nation’s “Islamic” and “Malay” character. It does not address individual rights, except for religious “practice … in peace and harmony” (Article 3).
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Brunei Foreign Policy
By Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan ( Office of Labour Affairs, Royal Thai)
The main objective of the Brunei Foreign Policy is to promote national interests, including maintaining sovereignty. Independence and integrity of the land. Creating economic and social prosperity. And the treatment of political identity. Culture and religion. As well as peace and security stability and prosperity in regional and global.
Brunei, the use of multilateral mechanisms in regional and international level is the main tool in its foreign policy to increase bargaining power. Strengthen security and political and economic interests. Especially with ASEAN. (Which is a foreign policy pillars of the ASEAN) Economic Cooperation in Asia – Pacific. Meeting Asia – Europe. Commonwealth countries. Organization of Islamic Conference. And the United Nations. In Brunei, the bilateral friendly international efforts, both in trade and investment for economic benefits. And also had a military alliance with other countries to strengthen the defense.
Principles of the Foreign Policy of Brunei, the key is to respect the sovereignty and integrity of the land of freedom of other countries to accept the equal status of various countries, non-interference in internal affairs of each other. Dispute by peaceful means and international cooperation for mutually beneficial.
The head of the national leaders governments withdraw the various countries visited by ourselves to the role of Brunei in Brunei makes the international stage has been recognized by various countries in and outside Southeast Asia.
In 2004 and 2005 Pope Rachatibdi the king often visited foreign countries to strengthen relationships with foreign countries. And to seek business opportunities in global markets continued. Since Brunei has foreign policy that is friendly to all countries in particular, the economic superpower (the U.S. include Japan, China) countries in the Middle East. As well as close neighbors in ASEAN, Brunei also has the support of their role in the region by sending more troops to observe the cease-fire between the Philippine government and Islamic Liberation Front Motionwear Robert (Moro Islamic Liberation Front-MILF) in Mindaena. and Brunei to join the peace-monitoring mission in Aceh Province with.
Brunei in 2005 focused on the strengthening of relationships with countries that import oil and natural gas (eg China) to more by the Brunei government expects China will continue to demand more power and the will of Brunei.
China will choose a partnership in the exploration and development of natural resources with the addition of Brunei, Malaysia. Singapore sees as Brunei is the national interest is to find alternative sources of energy reserves in the future by importing more natural gas from Malaysia and Indonesia today.
Brunei supported the International Cooperation Multilateral popular (multilateralism), especially in the actions of the international community under the “Millennium Goals” and consider issues facing various countries in the world today are more diverse and send. broad impact. Problems in one country affect other countries with different problems, so that will lead to stability. Peace and prosperity of the international society. Require the cooperation of all countries.
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