UPGRADE: Cambodia spearheads opposition to the most controversial non-CBRN weapons such as cluster munitions, which are explosive devices that scatter hundreds of smaller submunitions (called bomblets) over a small area to kill enemy personnel and destroy their vehicles.
The Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak reported on 18 January that Washington intends to deploy around 2,500 troops to northern Syria. A US military official recently said that there is a Russian-Iranian initiative to expel Washington’s troops from Syria.
China's GDP expanded 6.3 percent year-on-year in the second quarter, the fastest growth in two years, taking first-half growth to 5.5 percent to 59.3 trillion yuan ($8.3 trillion). The country's economic recovery continues steadily amid headwinds including a volatile international environment, a slowdown in global trade and investment as well as financial turbulence.
When APEC Trade Ministers gathered for their annual meeting in Detroit in May, there was a side meeting to which the United States, as APEC’s Chair this year, could not be invited. That meeting was convened by New Zealand as the current Chair of the Ministerial Commission of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and brought together the agreement’s 11 signatories.
Cambodia should spearhead the push against cluster bombs
By lan Storey
Cambodia's tragic experience during the US War on Vietnam gives it moral standing. But first, it needs to lead by example.
Weapons of war are, by design, meant to kill and maim people. Their use is, therefore, always highly controversial. But some types of weapons are more controversial than others, including landmines, boobytraps, napalm, flamethrowers and, most of all, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
Among the most controversial non-CBRN weapons are cluster munitions, explosive devices which scatter hundreds of smaller submunitions (called bomblets) over a small area to kill enemy personnel and destroy their vehicles.
A small percentage of cluster munitions usually fail to explode. The bomblets remain in the ground for years, posing a deadly hazard to civilians and rendering arable land unusable. Since the Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC) was adopted in 2008,123 countries have agreed not to develop, produce, transfer, stockpile or use cluster munitions.
On July 7, however, US President Joe Biden announced that America would supply cluster munitions to Ukraine in an effort to speed up Kyiv's much- anticipated but slower-than- expected counter-offensive against Russian forces which invaded the country in February 2022. None of the three countries is party to the CMC. Within days of Mr Biden's announcement, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen took to social media to condemn the decision. While acknowledging that his country was "small and weak, and our voice is weightless", he issued a heartfelt plea to America not to send cluster munitions to Ukraine, and for Ukraine not to use them.
"It will be the worst danger for the Ukrainians for decades or even centuries, he lamented, - because the real victims will be civilians."
"Cambodia speaks from tragic experience. Between 1965 and 1973, during the US War on Vietnam, the United States dropped approximately 80,000 cluster munitions on Cambodia containing 26 million bomblets. Since the mid-1970s, Cambodia has had to deal with the deadly legacy of America's bombing campaign. It is estimated that five million to six million bomblets did not explode, contaminating an area of over 700 sq km. Since 1998, this unexploded ordnance (UXO) has killed over 20,000 Cambodians and injured another 40,000. Those who accidentally step on the bomblets often lose a limb. Many are children playing in the fields.
With financial assistance from other countries- including the US - and International non-governmental organisations, Cambodia has spent millions of dollars trying to clear up the problem. In doing so, Cambodian deminers have become among the most experienced in the world, experience it has generously shared with many other countries.
Among those countries is Ukraine. Since Russia's Invasion, Ukraine has been facing a huge UXO problem, which the United Nations Development Programme has compared to the situation in Europe at the end of World War Il. It estimates that clearing the UXO will cost US$200million to US$300 million per year for at least the next five years, and probably much longer.
During a telephone call with President Volodymyr Zelensky in November 2022, Mr Hun Sen offered Cambodia's demining expertise to Ukraine. He was as good as his word. In January 2023, 15 Ukrainians undertook a six-day training course at the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in Kampong Chhang. Later in 2023, Cambodia plans to send its deminers to Poland to train teams of Ukrainian civil defence personnel to clear UXO in liberated areas.
Among the Asean member states, Cambodia has been one of the strongest critics of Russia's unlawful attack on Ukraine. In March 2022, Mr Hun Sen ordered his diplomats at the UN in New York to co-sponsor two General Assembly resolutions condemning the invasion. He has labelled the Kremlin's actions an "act of aggression" and stated that his country cannot remain neutral.
In justifying his opposition to the invasion, Mr Hun Sen has not only invoked Russia's violation of international law and the UN Charter, but also his own country's historical experiences, recalling that "Cambodia's independence and sovereignty were once invaded"
Many observers assumed that he was referring to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. He was not. Mr Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge soldier who later defected to Vietnam, views Hanoi's ouster of the genocidal Pol Pot regime not as an invasion, but as an act of liberation.
What Mr Hun Sen was almost certainly alluding to was Thailand's occupation of land near the Preah Vihear Temple in 2007 and 2008. Cambodia and Thailand have been at loggerheads for decades over sovereignty of the temple and its surrounding land.
When the conflict erupted again in February 2011, Thailand admitted to using cluster munitions against Cambodian forces, killing two soldiers and injuring seven, two of whom lost limbs. It was the first time cluster munitions had been used since the CMC was adopted in 2008.
Yet, despite Cambodia's terrible experiences with cluster munitions, it is not a party to the CMC.
Although Cambodia was a keen supporter of the Oslo Process which led to the 2008 consensus, and attended a number of CMC meetings as an observer until 2015, it has stopped short of signing the agreement.
Even more surprisingly, Cambodia still stockpiles its own cluster munitions, though it is unclear what types and how many.
Cambodian officials have advanced three reasons why Cambodia has not signed the CMC.
First, because it does not have the technical or financial resources to destroy its stockpiles.
Second, because the CMC does not provide a clear definition of cluster munitions. Some of Cambodia's cluster munitions, many of which were manufactured in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, may fall into a grey area under the convention.
Third, the government has cited unspecified "security concerns" and linked these with the need for its neighbours to accede to the CMC. Presumably, Thailand is uppermost in its mind, even though the temple dispute has been largely resolved and the chances of another clash between Thai and Cambodian security forces are slim.
Mr Hun Sen's passionate call for Ukraine not to use cluster munitions in its conflict with Russia, as well as his support for demining efforts in Ukraine, are laudable.
But their impending use in that conflict provides Cambodia with an opportunity to lead by example. Not only must Cambodia sign and ratify the CMC, and destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions, but it must also launch a diplomatic campaign to persuade its fellow Asean member states to do likewise (so far, only Laos and the Philippines are parties to the CMC).
In doing so, Mr Hun Sen can prove that while Cambodia may be small, it is not weak nor is its voice weightless. As Singapore has proven time and again, small states have both agency and influence in international affairs. The time has come for Cambodia to exercise moral leadership and spearhead efforts to ensure South-east Asia becomes a cluster munitions-free zone.
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2,500 more US troops to occupy Syria
The Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak reported on 18 January that Washington intends to deploy around 2,500 troops to northern Syria. A US military official recently said that there is a Russian-Iranian initiative to expel Washington’s troops from Syria.
“Following Turkiye's relentless struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a series of controversial steps have been taken consecutively by the US,” the report reads, adding that Washington “has recently announced the deployment of 2,500 troops to northern regions of Syria.”
“Several sources reveal that the 2,500 US soldiers, having completed their training, are scheduled to be deployed to Syria and Iraq for a minimum of nine months,” the Turkish report goes on to say.
According to the report, their “primary objective” will be to support Kurdish militants, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are military aligned with the Kurdish Peoples Protection Units (YPG), a branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist organization by Ankara.
Yeni Safak says that this deployment raises concerns in Turkiye, given Washington’s recent commitment to counterterrorism efforts during the NATO summit in Lithuania last week.
Ankara has long accused foreign intelligence, namely US intelligence, of supporting the PKK. While Washington denies this, it openly backs the SDF under the pretext of combatting ISIS.
The deployment plans “cast doubt on the clarity … of the US counterterrorism position, and raise questions about its commitment to its allies.”
On top of the deployment, the US has dispatched advanced military equipment to Syria recently, the report says, including more HIMARS rocket systems, which have been sent to the northeastern Deir Ezzor governorate.
HIMARS had previously already arrived in Syria, however, Washington denied they were bound for Kurdish militias.
US-backed Kurds have a strong presence in the region. However, northeastern Syria is also where a large portion of US occupation troops are stationed. Their bases in this region have been the targets of numerous drone and missile attacks carried out by Iran-linked groups in the country.
Additionally, as an ally of Damascus which strongly contributed to the defeat of militant groups in the country, Moscow’s presence in Syria has been bolstered.
US officials said on 17 July that a Russian jet recently flew “very close” to a US surveillance aircraft, “putting the lives of the four American crew members in danger,” Politico reported.
According to Yeni Safak, Washington is using “threats from Russia and Iran” as a pretext for the massive troop deployment, while the true objective is to “bolster” the Kurds.
However, a few days ago, a senior US military official was quoted as saying that Russian and Iranian forces in Syria have been
coordinating with the specific aim of forcing Washington’s troops to eventually withdraw from the country.
Additionally, the US has continued to reinforce its bases across northeast Syria.
China's Q2 GDP expands 6.3% in fastest pace in 2 years as recovery continues
By Global Times
China's GDP expanded 6.3 percent year-on-year in the second quarter, the fastest growth in two years, taking first-half growth to 5.5 percent to 59.3 trillion yuan ($8.3 trillion). The country's economic recovery continues steadily amid headwinds including a volatile international environment, a slowdown in global trade and investment as well as financial turbulence.
With more support policies being rolled out, China is capable of achieving its annual growth target of around 5 percent this year as well as steady and sustained high-quality development for a long time to come, and the Chinese economy will continue to be a key driver for the world economy, analysts said on Monday.
The growth rate means the fastest pace since the second quarter of 2021, when growth hit 8.3 percent. In the first quarter of 2023, China's GDP grew by 4.5 percent.
"The achievement is hard-won amid multiple domestic and external challenges. It reflects that Chinese consumers' confidence wasn't seriously damaged and that the country's dual circulation development paradigm driven by high-tech sector offsets slowdown in external demand," Cao Heping, an economist at Peking University, told the Global Times.
He said there were multiple highlights contributing to China's economic recovery in the second quarter, including sales of new-energy vehicles and relevant components, steady foreign trade growth and stable growth of infrastructure investment.
Read more here.
Taiwan abandoning the one-China framework aggravates the risk of war
By Terry Gou
Terry Gou, the founder of Foxconn, is a leading member of the opposition in Taiwan.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showing that large-scale war involving great powers is a 21st-century reality, the Taiwan Strait has reemerged as one of the most dangerous front lines in the world. Recent visits to Beijing by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen opened a more promising pathway for U.S.-China relations than has existed in the past few years, but as long as the future of Taiwan remains fraught, there cannot be stability in those relations nor assurance of the peace that the people of Taiwan deserve.
Beijing, Washington and Taipei share responsibility for the current state of confrontation. But Taiwan is most at risk — and it is up to Taiwan, its people and its leaders to take the necessary steps to secure its future.
The current Democratic Progressive Party leadership has only made the situation more tense. Under the so-called 1992 Consensus, Taiwan and China agreed to accept the framework of “one China” — although the parties have differing interpretations of that term — and held discussions that over the years resulted in a number of productive agreements. But shortly after Tsai Ing-wen became Taiwan’s president in 2016, China cited her refusal to accept Beijing’s interpretation — which includes Taiwan as part of China — as a justification to end the cross-strait talks, and they have not resumed.
Vice President Lai Ching-te, who is running to succeed Tsai as president, has called for reducing trade ties with China, which he calls “dependencies,” and insists that they can be replaced by an international network of partners. Like Tsai, he rejects the one-China framework.
But the 1992 Consensus the ruling party wishes to walk away from has facilitated millions of visits across the strait, massive investments and two-way trade, economic growth, hundreds of weekly direct flights, a relaxation in tensions and a sense of optimism about a peaceful future on both sides. By abandoning the one-China framework for talks, the current leaders in Taiwan and those in their party who would replace them have greatly aggravated the threat of war, isolated Taiwan internationally, damaged our economy, scared away investors and made Taiwan less secure.
I have long advocated the immediate resumption of direct cross-strait negotiations between Taiwan and China as the only way to truly ease tensions and to preserve Taiwan’s democracy, freedom and rule of law. Posturing for partisan political advantage or to piggyback on U.S.-China confrontation is no substitute for the real work of talking and negotiating with those who will have the most impact on our future. To loosely quote the late Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin, you negotiate peace with your enemies, not with your friends. We need to ensure that in the future Taiwan and China will not behave as enemies, as they see each other under the present leadership. My extensive business dealings and personal experience with China — both its leadership and its people — tell me that they need not be.
The people of Taiwan need peace and stability to ensure a bright future, unclouded by uncertainty. Peace is not an abstraction for me. I am part of the generation that fought to defend Taiwan: I served 50 years ago on Kinmen, which was bombarded by China in 1958, with hostilities persisting for two decades. We, the people of Taiwan, must ensure that such events are never repeated. Unfortunately, reckless rhetoric and provocative policies are making a recurrence more likely, not less.
Taiwan has become a world leader in technology and economic development. It has done so in no small part by leveraging the entrepreneurial talents of its people and businesses with Chinese partners. In direct talks with the Chinese, it can show the world that it also can be a responsible global political actor by defending its integrity and values in pragmatic negotiations on vital issues and defusing tensions.
Taiwan’s people greatly appreciate the material and moral support the United States has provided over the past seven decades. Taiwan’s democracy, its economic dynamism and its strong defense owe much to the American people. That support is still important. But there comes a time when a people has to assume principal responsibility for itself, not accept a tutelage that becomes an unhealthy dependency. Taiwan has to take control of its destiny, strengthen deterrence capability and, at the same time, deliver an approach to peace that benefits the region and the globe, but most of all itself.
It can do so only by working with China directly on the basis of the one-China framework.
That will necessitate direct, face-to-face talks
by senior leaders of both governments. There is room in such a framework for Taiwan to fully protect its democracy, freedom and way of life even as we undertake what is sure to be a long and arduous process of discussion and negotiation. But in the meantime, it is absolutely vital that China and Taiwan agree on a framework and a process that can pull us back from the precipice.
Read more here.
New Zealand’s Agreement on Economic Cooperation is with the separate customs territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu
By Stephen Jacobi
When APEC Trade Ministers gathered for their annual meeting in Detroit in May, there was a side meeting to which the United States, as APEC’s Chair this year, could not be invited. That meeting was convened by New Zealand as the current Chair of the Ministerial Commission of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and brought together the agreement’s 11 signatories. Though this might not have troubled them unduly, the US was left looking in from the outside, highlighting Donald Trump’s unfortunate decision in January 2017 to leave the Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP’s predecessor agreement, which it brokered and co-founded in 2016.
On 15-16 July, CPTPP Ministers again gathered, this time in Auckland, for their annual Ministerial Commission. Ministers had before them a number of thorny issues to discuss, including welcoming the United Kingdom as CPTPP’s 12th member, commissioning a broad review of the agreement, and discussing how to manage the large number of aspirant economies now lining up to join the free trade agreement. In a world where trade liberalization is becoming politically toxic among many democratic electorates, CPTPP still stands as an ambitious and high-quality instrument. How the process of its expansion and deepening is handled will determine how useful the agreement remains.
From humble beginnings
From the very beginning, the CPTPP’s vision has been about the more open economies in APEC coming together to set a new standard for economic integration in the region. Notions of the “Asia pivot,” much vaunted by the Obama administration, came much later. The TPP was not originally an American idea: rather, the concept grew from more humble origins with four economies at the outset in 2005 (New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei, known as “P4”.) The founders always had their sights on including the US. Parts of the agreement envisioned by P4, notably in financial services, were deliberately left uncompleted. In 2008, the US under the Bush Administration was persuaded to join. By the time the TPP was signed in Auckland in February 2016, there were 12 members including Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam. Despite the reversal of January 2017 when the Trump Administration abruptly withdrew, the remaining 11 signatories persevered to bring CPTPP into effect as an “open plurilateral.” This means that accession is available to any economy willing and able to meet CPTPP’s high standards, including in both market access and forward-looking trade rules.
CPTPP is particularly attractive from a business perspective, including as a means to eliminate costly barriers to trade and investment for goods and services, both at and behind the border, to promote regulatory coherence and ease of doing business as well as to address sustainability and other stakeholder concerns. The broader vision of CPTPP is as a pathway to the lofty goal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), originally mooted by the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in 2004 and still very much a part of APEC’s Putrajaya Vision 2040, a blueprint for APEC priorities to modernize over the next near-two decades.
Changed circumstances
In the period since the TPP, many other plurilateral FTAs have been concluded. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), led by ASEAN (and not China as is often claimed), is now fully in effect as the world’s largest FTA, albeit with provisions that are not generally as ambitious as CPTPP. In the Americas, NAFTA was replaced in 2020 by USMCA (US-Mexico-Canada Agreement), ironically largely built on TPP. Today, enthusiasm for freer trade appears to be waning among key voters and policymakers of major economies worldwide. The world is turning increasingly inward as notions of “strategic autonomy,” protectionism, and its sidekick “industrial policy” have taken hold. The US has not signed a free trade agreement for some years now and is lukewarm at best about multilateral trade rules. Instead, the US is championing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as a new, non-binding model for economic cooperation, but without offering market access.
Business practices have also continued to evolve. The pandemic has shortened global value chains. The digital economy has continued to advance. While CPTPP is now in operation for all 11 founding members, this has been a slow process. Economies have been slow to implement all CPTPP requirements. The pandemic has frustrated progress with CPTPP’s built-in work program. The agreement is in need of updating and expanding to maintain both its relevance and its cutting edge.
Yet at the same time, the list of economies wanting to accede to CPTPP has never been longer. The conclusion of negotiations for the UK’s accession was announced in May. China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and now Ukraine have also deposited formal requests for accession. Dealing with these applications in a reasonable timeframe is no easy matter, especially when the agreement, unwisely, has no standing secretariat but relies on resources contributed by member economies.
To expand or not
China’s application is likely to raise questions for a number of CPTPP members, particularly at a time of heightened geopolitical tension. There can be little doubt that the Chinese application is a serious one and not, as some would have it, a maneuver to throw a spanner in CPTPP’s works. China is seeking new markets for expanding production. China says it is committed to ongoing reform and opening up of its economy and this is a way of demonstrating this commitment. In recent weeks, China has started to more actively prepare for accession by moving to prohibit the transfer of software source code, though this notably will apply only within the mainland’s free trade zones. This is also seen as assisting China’s application for membership in the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), a highly advanced deal among Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and now South Korea to improve governance over the fast-growing digital sector.
Even so, difficulties over China’s CPTPP accession are foreseen in areas such as Chinese state-owned enterprises, subsidies, intellectual property, and other aspects of digital governance as well as labor and environmental issues. China can be expected to be a tough negotiator. It will be conscious too of the flexibilities given to Vietnam in some areas. One area where it can offer advantages to CPTPP members with which it does not already share FTAs is market access. CPTPP members may be attracted to this and to the bigger picture of embedding China, as the world’s second-largest economy, more firmly into their leading framework of trade rules in the region.
China’s application may be challenging but, in this, it is not alone. Managing Taiwan’s application at the height of geopolitical tension in the Taiwan Strait will be a delicate exercise. Taipei has every right to seek accession: New Zealand for example has enjoyed excellent FTAs with both China and Taiwan.1
Ecuador and Costa Rica are newcomers to Asia-Pacific trade diplomacy. Uruguay’s application is more complex since it is a member of the Southern Common Market, known by its Spanish abbreviation MERCOSUR. Ukraine’s interest introduces a different type of political complexity: negotiating a trade agreement with an economy in the middle of a war will be anything but straightforward. Whether the US might one day seek to re-join the earlier TPP or CPTPP or propose something else, like an expanded USMCA, need not have taken up much time at the Auckland CPTPP Ministerial - there is little appetite for this in Washington in the medium term.
Ministers clearly had a lot on their plate in Auckland. Outstanding issues are unlikely to have been fully resolved, apart from the formal accession of the UK. The best outcome would have been an agreement to move forward with the processes already established in CPTPP’s Accessions Protocol. This requires the process to be initiated “within a reasonable period of time” of receipt of the application and for accession, working parties to be established in close consultation with the aspirants. The Protocol also establishes indicative timelines, although these do not appear to have been strictly followed in the case of the UK.
It is understandable that these things take time, but that is all the more reason to begin the process if only to provide encouragement to those in the waiting room, and to attract others like South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, which are still considering whether to join the party. But jumpstarting the accessions process appears to have been too audacious a step in Auckland where Ministers prioritized a wider review of other aspects of the agreement. There is a risk that a lengthy review will add more delay. That will be regrettable for businesses in the region which in the aftermath of the pandemic are looking for new generators of business growth.
Competitive liberalisation
It’s often the case that nothing encourages trade liberalization than the thought that others might get ahead. That’s an argument for setting up competitive accession processes within CPTPP by which those who are prepared to do more to meet the standards can get the green light more rapidly. Unfortunately, the political reality does not favor this outcome as the whole process is subject to consensus amongst existing members.
CPTPP however is far from the only game in town. The first best option for trade liberalization is always multilateral, through the World Trade Organization (WTO), which continues to play a crucial role in underpinning global trade rules. While the WTO made some progress at its last Ministerial, for example in the area of fishery subsidies, the organization remains seriously weakened by the lack of consensus around the future of its dispute settlement system.
Then there are bilateral and other plurilateral agreements. The former set continues to be made, though at a reduced pace and with varying levels of ambition. They add to the noodle bowl of existing agreements and can be confusing to businesses. As for the latter, RCEP is now in operation for all its 15 members but progress in establishing a secretariat and getting the machinery of working committees moving have been slow. IPEF has delivered a surprising early harvest in its Supply Chain Pillar, also announced at APEC in Detroit, but the terms are light on binding commitments and heavy on consultative committees. The pillar is bold in scope, but there is skepticism at this stage about whether it can be made to work. In comparison with these other options, CPTPP offers a more compelling and enforceable vision for businesses which is precisely why, from such humble beginnings, the enterprise has weathered even the US withdrawal.
In Auckland, the challenge was to deliver some clear signals on the future direction of CPTPP to keep the flame of trade liberalization alive and provide a basis for an improved business environment in the Asia-Pacific. CPTPP has always been about a big idea – freer trade and investment under better trade rules can provide impetus to economic integration, sustainable global growth, and development. CPTPP needs to remain a big tent with room for all who are prepared to subscribe to its high standards, with ultimately as few players as possible left looking in from the outside.
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[1] New Zealand’s Agreement on Economic Cooperation is with the separate customs territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu
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