Espionage Edition
Modi's merry dance a hard act to follow, US spies see China, Russia militaries working closer on Taiwan, Australian activities inside China’s EEZ, Another Australian Spy Tale,
Modi's merry dance a hard act to follow
By James Curran (Australian Financial Review AFR)
Australia, like many in the West, has one arm firmly around Delhi's economic and strategic opportunities and the other rather awkwardly around Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's increasingly illiberal authoritarianism.
Revelations of Indian espionage in Australia and the pressuring of Australian journalist Avani Dias to leave the country are raising fresh questions about exactly what kind of partner India will be in Modi's hands.
Dias' accreditation to report on India's general elections had been threatened. According to Human Rights Watch Australia director Daniela Gavshon, Indian authorities extended Dias' visa by two months at the eleventh hour, but "the government had made it too difficult for her to do herjob".
That came shortly before the Washington Post revealed that ASIO had kicked "a nest" of Indian spies out of Australia in 2020, a rare move by a "friendly" nation.
These hiccups follow years of increasing closeness between Australia and India. For ties long considered neglected or shamefully underdone, India has been moving ever closer to the centre of Australian foreign policy priorities.
Visiting Australia in May last year, Modi and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese pledged to take the two countries Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to "greater heights over the next decade". Then, during a rally at a Sydney sports stadium where Modi addressed thousands of Indian-Australian citizens, Albanese described his guest as "the boss".
Modi, drawing again on the cricketing trope so pathetically dominant in the relationship's rhetoric, said "our ties have entered the 120 mode", suggesting that diplomatic, economic and strategic bounties were about to flow.
Earlier this year, former prime minister Tony Abbott echoed many across the West when he labelled India the "world's emerging democratic superpower".
Federal Labor MP Andrew Charlton represents an electorate in western Sydney which is home to a large proportion of Indian-Australians and has written a book entitled Australia's Pivot to India.
It freely borrowed from the Obama-era language of American foreign policy, the very word carrying with it the sense of a belated strategic awakening. As Charlton stressed in his preface, whereas the 20th century was America's, and the 19th an age of empire, "we may well end the twenty-first century with India on top".
These statements are only a snapshot of the expectations about what a rising India can mean for the geopolitical balance of power.
India is being fitted into a premade, and fundamentally flawed Western mould: as the democratic bulwark to a rising and assertive China. That has
India's willing membership of the Quad, alongside Australia, Japan and the United States.
India... is not easily shoe-horned into a monochromatic Hindu state. Peter Varghese, former Australian high commissioner to India
Even when India has not followed the script the West writes for it, as in its refusal to condemn Putin's war in Ukraine, ongoing enthusiasm services a common hope that may never be achieved: a soft alliance against China.
Concerns about Modi's growing illiberalism and his Hindu nationalist agenda are not new. But as India goes to the polls, the pressures on civil society have become more acute.
Modi's cult of personality is becoming quasi-imperial.
Roundabouts in India's major cities are akin to Modi merry-go-rounds, his towering image tracking the travelling eye. India's COVID vaccine certificates were stamped with Modi's image. Vice-chancellors at universities have been instructed to install "selfie points" so that students can capture images of themselves with the leader.
These factors, along with the centralising of power in his office and ongoing challenges to the independence of the media and the judiciary, led distinguished Indian scholar Ramachandra Guha to declare of Modi, that "the self-proclaimed Hindu monk of the past has ... become, in symbol if not in substance, the Hindu emperor of the present".
But what kind of challenge does Modi's India present to Australian foreign policy into the future? The broader question for policymakers is how will Canberra deal with Indonesia, China, Japan and India other than just fearing abandonment?
Peter Varghese, former secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade and before that Australian High Commissioner to India, sets out the reality.
"Whatever direction Indian politics takes over the next decade or so, it is likely to emerge as the world's third-largest economy, a much stronger defence industrial base, and an activist foreign policy designed to position India as a separate pole in a more multipolar world. This is what India means when it says it strives to become a leading power," he says.
What form this more confident Indian nationalism might take, with its sharper elbows at home and abroad, is another question.
Varghese is less sure about the ultimate success of Modi's Hindu nationalist project.
"How far and how fast he can implement this agenda is an open question. India is fundamentally a diverse nation which is not easily shoehorned into a monochromatic Hindu state”.
The likely mess that such a confrontation with 200 million Muslims might bring looms. Though Guha does not think India will follow Sri Lanka's example, where an economy believed to be on the cusp of joining other Asian tigers devolved into three decades of civil war.
Varghese, a historian by training. recalls that Indian democracy did recover from the strain of Indira Gandhi's "emergency" in the 1970s, "with its frontal assault on the rule of law and freedom of the press and imprisonment of opposition leaders".
He adds: "This suggests there is nothing wrong with indian democracy, which cannot be fixed by what is right with Indian democracy.
There's no need for Western diplomatic medicine or finger pointing about democratic backsliding either, Varghese says. "That will be counterproductive. This is India's battle, and it must be resolved by Indian voters."
Quiet but patient explanation is the order of the day, he says, presenting the case, "why an India, which turns its back on its secular liberal democratic character, makes it a much diminished strategic and economic partner for Australia".
The geopolitical implications here are obvious. As Varghese explains: "India as a balancer of China makes much less sense if it is no longer a liberal democracy. Australia wants to see China balanced because it is an authoritarian state which seeks to become the regional hegemon. An authoritarian India is a much less credible balancer than a liberal democratic India.
Externally, India is unlikely to play the role of aggressor. But the relationship between India and China will surely be fraught: they are made for misunderstandings and India may well be overplaying its hand as the coming economic power.
The onset of modernisation brings with it not only rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, but mass nationalism and the intense need for social bonding. Modi is harvesting those very sentiments now to "make India great".
But nationalism, as is all too evident, can be a jealous master.
There are no easy answers to Australia's Modi dilemma. He will likely emerge strengthened when the election results are known on June 4.
Don't bet on Australian leaders relinquishing strategic dreams about what India might become. But a little more clarity and prudence about India's trajectory would not go astray.
Read more here.
US spies see China, Russia militaries working closer on Taiwan
By Times of India (Bloomberg)
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said today that China and Russia have begun closer military ties that could possibly threaten Taiwan.
US intelligence officials assess that Russia and China are working more closely together on military issues, including a potential invasion of Taiwan, prompting new planning across the government to counter a potential scenario in which the countries fight in coordination.
Haines said China and Russia are cooperating “across really every sector of society.”
Republican Senator Mike Rounds of South Dakota asked Haines about such a potential scenario during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“Certainly it’s a possibility,” she said. “The question of just how likely it is, I think differs depending on the scenario.”
Rounds also asked Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, about the Pentagon’s planning for such a possibility.
The United States has “become even more concerned about our joint force requirements in an environment where” China and Russia are cooperating.
Australian activities inside China’s EEZ
When Australia sends vessels into the South China Sea, is it a brave assertion of freedom of navigation or about gathering intelligence?
By Bernard Keane (Crikey.com)
As more dangerous interactions between Australian and Chinese military forces occur in the South China Sea, it’s important to explore what the legal basis is for Australia’s activities — and what neither the government nor the media reveal about them.
Defence Minister Richard Marles says Australia is acting in accordance with international law when conducting naval and aviation activities in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Just so — there is no doubt that EEZs around the world are international waters.
EEZs encompass waters extending up to 200 nautical miles (approximately 340 kilometres) from a country’s shores. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state has the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within its EEZ. China has ratified the convention, established its own EEZ, and also recognises those of other states.
But the United States has not ratified the convention — the only major maritime power to not do so. However, it says it will act in accordance with its provisions. And it established its EEZ within 200 nautical miles of its coast and also recognises the EEZ of other states.
But it also says it has the right to conduct military and intelligence-collection activities within any country’s EEZ. China disagrees. It says it respects freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, but does not respect the right of foreign governments to conduct military and intelligence-collection activities within its EEZ.
More to the point, the three major regional maritime powers friendly to Australia — India, Indonesia and the Philippines — agree with China.
For example, in April last year, the US 7th Fleet carried out a freedom-of-navigation operation in the EEZ of Quad partner India. India objected, saying the convention “does not authorise other states to carry out in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state”.
So what benefit do we get from upholding the US approach to EEZs, especially given the potential to upset key regional powers we want on our side? An expert from the US Naval War College who testified before Congress in 2009, said if it accepted the position of China, India, the Philippines and Indonesia on EEZs, the US would be forced to conduct military operations from more than 200 miles offshore.
That would significantly reduce the range of US sensors and missiles, making intelligence-gathering much harder and making it much more difficult to deploy US marines and their equipment in amphibious assaults. America’s ability to project naval and air power would face limitations not only in the South China Sea but also in other EEZs such as the Persian Gulf. Its ability to use the world’s oceans as a medium of manoeuvre and global power projection would be threatened.
This approach has consequences. China has begun to conduct intelligence-gatheringand presence operations in other countries’ EEZs, including Australia’s, justifying its behaviour by saying that it would not do so if Australia adopted its own position on the sovereignty of EEZs. Australia can have no complaint if China adopts the very behaviour we’re engaging in.
The real nature of the dispute over EEZs is rarely, if ever, made clear by the Australian government. The presence of Australian vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea is always explained in vague terms as about “freedom of navigation”, without saying what that actually involves — dropping sonobuoys to identify Chinese submarines and ships in order to destroy them at the start of hostilities. Instead, Australian vessels and aircraft are portrayed as innocently exercising their rights under
international law in the face of a belligerent power.
Australian media rarely deviate from the government line. In foreign media, however, it is relatively normal to note that there is a fundamental dispute between the US and China over what conduct is permissible in EEZs.
Australians deserve to be told what the objective is: to uphold America’s desire to project power in every EEZ in the world, not just the South China Sea. Otherwise they will continue to be misled if or when a clash occurs.
Read more here.
Another Australian Spy Tale
By Four Corners (ABC TV)
In 2011, without telling his handler, “Eric” travelled to Hong Kong and declared who he was working for at the US consulate. American officials took him seriously.
For 15 years, Eric would be assigned to a series of [Chinese] secret police handlers who directed him to infiltrate pro-democracy organisations and hunt down dissidents that were now Chinese government targets.
2016
In 2016 he was invited to a gathering of activists in India’s Dharamshala, home of the Tibetan government-in-exile.
There, he met with the Dalai Lama. He was rewarded with higher stakes missions to help ensnare high-profile opponents living abroad.
During 2016, Eric was based in Cambodia and ordered to target political cartoonist Wang Liming, also known as Rebel Pepper.
His work variously depicts Xi as a dumpling, a tyrant, and Winnie the Pooh – and the Chinese Communist Party as a tentacled monster.
Eric was given an apartment in Phnom Penh and a cover story, working as a planning supervisor for the multi-billion-dollar conglomerate Prince Holding Group, which has connections to Cambodia’s leadership.
Cambodia and Laos have close ties with the Chinese government and there have been allegations in the past that it can operate freely in both countries.
At the time, Rebel Pepper was living in Japan, so Eric was ordered to lure him to Cambodia where he could be arrested by and returned to China to face trial.
High-ranking secret police officials travelled from Beijing to a private clubhouse in Phnom Penh to discuss the entrapment with Eric.
He then contacted Rebel Pepper using his cover at Prince Real Estate, asking the cartoonist to design a logo for them.
Rebel Pepper’s designs were used by Prince Real Estate at their events and Eric arranged for senior managers to pose with a giant inflatable version of one of them.
Secret police then organised a job interview for Rebel Pepper in Cambodia, but his wife suspected it was a trap and dissuaded him from going.
Four Corners met with Rebel Pepper – who now lives in the US – and told him he had been a target of the secret police.
2018
Eric was ordered to hunt down Edwin Yin, a YouTuber who has been deeply critical of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
[Edwin] Yin … born in 1982, from Shengzhou, Zhejiang … He fled to Thailand, Singapore and other places, and is now in Australia.
While Edwin claims he is a dissident on the run, China says it is tracking him down because he is a criminal. He was charged with fraud in China and Four Corners has spoken to a man who says he is one of his victims.
Following Eric’s revelations, Four Corners learned of an AFP raid in Sydney last year. Edwin’s name was one of the names listed on the AFP search warrant as a victim of the spying operation.
2018
Also in 2018, Eric was sent to Thailand to befriend Hua Yong, an exiled Chinese artist and activist hiding in Bangkok who had long been an outspoken critic of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2012, Hua had staged a protest commemorating the Tiananmen Square massacre by punching himself in the face.
Eric [Chinese] handler said that Hua Yong is short of money and wants to do business together. You think of a way to lure him to Cambodia or Laos.
2021
By April 2021, the plan [had] almost faltered when Hua was granted a temporary protection visa by Canada. A few months later, Hua moved to Vancouver and Eric filed a comprehensive intelligence report at the request of his handler, including Hua’s phone number, address, where he went and who he met.
But in November 2022 – more than a year-and-a-half after he arrived – Hua was found dead. He died while kayaking on a cold autumn night.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police concluded Hua’s death was not suspicious.
Also in 2021, while he was still in Thailand, his [Chinese] handler asked him to target a Chinese military veteran living in Myanmar. Eric says he tried to help the veteran slip the net by blaming the pandemic, telling the handler he’d contacted him but Covid meant it would be hard to meet.
Eventually it was one of Eric’s cover stories that brought his time as a spy to an end.
The V Brigade videos sparked an inquiry by security officials in Beijing and Eric “flipped a coin to decide between Australia and New Zealand”.
2023
After landing on Australian soil last year, he walked into ASIO headquarters in Canberra and revealed who he was.
Eric shared hundreds of secret documents, text and voice messages, and bank records that he’d gathered over the years, and after weeks of complex negotiations, he agreed to an interview.
An Australian Government spokesperson said defending against malicious foreign interference was “a top priority”.
Read more here.
Chinese espionage arrests alarms Europe
By Amy Hawkins (The Guardian)
Increase in cases reflects changing mood across continent towards Chinese threats, say experts
As China’s president, Xi Jinping, arrived in Serbia for the second leg of his European tour, authorities across the continent were grappling with a wave of allegations about Chinese spying.
On Tuesday, the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, revealed that a “malign actor” had compromised British military payroll records, with reports pointing the finger at China.
And in Germany, three German citizens were arrested last month under suspicion of arranging to transfer information about sensitive technology to China, while in another case, a man named as Jian G, who worked for a German far-right member of the European parliament, was arrested under suspicion of espionage. Maximilian Krah, the Alternative for German (AfD) MEP who Jian G worked for, has denied any personal wrongdoing.
Meanwhile in Belgium, authorities opened a criminal investigation into the far-right politician Frank Creyelman in January, after an investigation by the Financial Times, Der Spiegel and Le Monde alleged that he had been used as a Chinese intelligence asset for several years.
Experts say the recent increase in arrests and investigations reflects a changing mood in Europe towards Chinese threats.
“A lot of this activity has been around a while,” said Martin Thorley, a senior analyst at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime. “Countries have now been forced confront it, despite the unpalatable nature of dealing with this at the same time as having market dependencies, supply-chain links etc in China. This has been present for a while and has been left too long.”
Roderich Kiesewetter, a German MP and former army officer, said the German secret services had been warning for “several years” about the threat from China but “the warning was … on purpose not heard”.
He noted that the recent arrests in Germany would have sent a “stronger signal” if they had been announced before the chancellor, Olaf Scholz, went to Beijing in April. Instead, they were made public days after Scholz’s return to Germany.
There are also concerns that the pace of Chinese influence operations in Europe – through traditional espionage and more “greyzone” activity such as influence peddling and transnational repression – has intensified, as attitudes towards China have hardened in recent years.
Nigel Inkster, the former deputy chief of MI6, says Europe has been more focused on the threat of Chinese intelligence activities since 2019. “The complexities in the European-Chinese relationship are such that it seems to be almost inevitable that we would see an increase in Chinese activity, both straightforward espionage and influence operations,” he said.
China has dismissed the allegations of espionage as “malicious slander”.
Inkster said the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, the revelations about human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China’s support of Russia in the war in Ukraine and concerns about China’s economic behaviour had sharpened the focus of European agencies on Chinese intelligence efforts.
Experts say Chinese spies have three main priorities: to shape political and economic trends in line with China’s interests; gather information on sensitive industries; and to monitor the diaspora populations, particularly minority groups such as Tibetans, Uyghurs and Hongkongers.
When it comes to overseas citizens, Chinese spies have several objectives, says Thorley. “To deter criticism, to court individuals where it might be advantageous, to gather intelligence. The upshot is that many diaspora groups face a double threat of xenophobia when relations with China deteriorate as well as elevated risks of being targeted by Chinese party-state authorities.”
Kiesewetter believes the targeting of diaspora groups is also designed to make them feel “insecure” and spread the message that Germany cannot protect people on its own soil.
China’s objectives were “nuanced and strategic”, Inkster said. “They are not about destruction for its own case. If there is chaos, China will seek to take advantage of it. But that’s a different thing from actually creating the chaos.”
China’s intelligence operations are traditionally understood to be managed by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which combines intelligence gathering, security services and the secret police. It has been described as a combination of the FBI and the CIA.
In recent months, the MSS has become increasingly vocal about its activities. Last year, the agency launched its own WeChat account, publicising its efforts to root out spies and terrorists. In January, it accused MI6 of recruiting a foreign consultant to spy on China.
But, notes Thorley, there is also a “latent network” of private companies and organisations in the UK that work to further the Chinese Communist party’s interests. “They aren’t micromanaged … however, if the party wants to, it pulls on the leash and gets what it wants.”
That highlights the fact that “China operates asymmetrically”, according to Sari Arho Havrén, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. “The complexity is quite difficult to detect because we can’t really match the magnitude of resources that China puts in.”
Read more here.