FRATRICIDE AND FRAGMENTATION
HOW CAMBODIA AND THAILAND BECAME VICTIMS OF THE US FRAGMENTATION STRATEGY FOR ASEAN
“With the United States waging proxy wars in Eastern Europe and Western Asia its plans for proxy wars in East Asia and South-east Asia have begun to take shape.”
By Dr. Digby James Wren
The question is simple: Who benefits from the Thai-Khmer Border dispute?
Following the largely successful fragmentation of Myanmar and subordination of the Philippines, it comes as no surprise for observers of ASEAN politics that US ambitions to fragment ASEAN, in order to contain China, shadow the escalation of tensions between Thailand and Cambodia.
The current Thai-Khmer tensions originate in a century-long dispute involving their common border in the Dângrêk Mountains where Cambodia’s northern border intersects with Sisaket Province of northeastern Thailand. However recent skirmishes along the shared frontier imply a larger regional strategy, involving extra-regional powers, to incite nationalist sentiment over borders and territorial sovereignty in order to subvert the current Thai government, disrupt Cambodia’s economic growth and destabilise regional peace and security.
While the Thai-Khmer border dispute commenced with the Angkorian Preah Vihear Temple, it also includes the ancient temple complexes of Ta Moan Thom, Ta Moan Touch, Ta Krabey and Mom Bei. Adding further complexity is the most recent conflict over the Chong Bok Pass of Ubon Ratchathani, located in the so-called ‘Emerald Triangle’ situated at the intersection of Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. Contestation over the six sites are the long-consequence of the 1904 and 1908 border demarcations agreed, under duress, by the Kingdom of Siam with the French colonial administration of Indochina.
In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is the principal judicial body of the United Nations, awarded the Preah Vihear Temple to Cambodia, but the frontier around the site remained in dispute. This ambiguity created what Thailand calls ‘the 4.6 square kilometre disputed area’, which Cambodia recognises as an integral part of its territory. In 2008, Cambodia’s nomination of the temple as a World Heritage site annoyed Thai nationalists and led to several violent incidents during the period 2008 to 2011. Moreover, the domestic politics of both countries, especially political turmoil in Thailand, have historically signalled new border incidents, nationalist rhetoric and military coups d’etat.
Unlike Cambodia, where the King remains virtually powerless, in Thailand’s history of military coups d’etat, monarchists and military align to overthrow democratically elected governments, especially those that maintain friendly relations with China. The Thai army’s escalation of the border dispute with Cambodia provides the nationalists within the military and royalist elites the required ‘failure of government’ to catalyze yet another coup d’etat. Like her father, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and her aunt, former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who were both forced out of office early in 2006 and 2014, respectively, Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s ‘compromise coalition’ government faces escalating military opposition.
In Thailand’s 2023 general election, rising public dissatisfaction with the country’s military rule, enabled the liberal Move Forward Party, the de facto successor to the previously dissolved Future Forward Party, to gain first place. Led by Pita Limjaroenrat, a Thai businessman with strong links to the United States, Move Forward was blocked by the Thai Senate and unable to secure the prime ministership in the first round of parliamentary voting. Before the second round, Limjaroenrat was suspended as a Member of Parliament (MP) by Thailand’s Constitutional Court over ownership of shares in a defunct ‘iTV’ broadcaster. Thus, his second nomination was blocked by the National Assembly.
The second placed Pheu Thai party founded by Thaksin Shinawatra, and led by Srettha Thavisin a 60-year-old property mogul, formed the ‘compromise coalition’ with the smaller military-aligned parties to gain a majority of votes within the Thai parliament for his election as prime minister. In January 2024, the Constitutional Court cleared Pita Limjaroenrat of wrongdoing and secured his status as an MP. However, in August 2024, the Move Forward Party was disbanded by the Constitutional Court and Pita Limjaroenrat and other party executives were banned from politics for ten years. Confirming his political links to the US government, Limjaroenrat left Thailand to commence a fellowship at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University.
August of 2024, also saw the Thai Constitutional Court remove Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin from office for appointing a minister with a criminal conviction, throwing the country into renewed political turmoil. Srettha Thavisin became the fourth Thai prime minister in sixteen years to be removed by verdicts of the Constitutional Court. The decision opened the way for Pheu Thai to nominate Thaksin Shinawatra’s 37-year-old daughter and Pheu Thai party leader Paetongtarn Shinawatra to become Thailand’s third Shinawatra clan prime minister following in her father’s and aunt Yingluck Shinawatra’s footsteps.
In December of 2024, the Pheu Thai party moved to diminish the power of Thailand’s military. Proposed amendments to the Defence Ministry Administration Act were designed to reduce the military's power to conduct coups d’etat by empowering a cabinet-appointed committee to consider and appoint generals instead of army commanders. Moreover, the defence minister would no longer be Defence Council chairman, that role would be filled by the prime minister. Additionally, the bill included strict criteria under Section 25, for those seeking promotion, and under Section 35, prohibiting military force or military personnel seizing or controlling the administrative power of the government.
The Defence Ministry Administration Act was withdrawn in mid-December 2024 after it failed to pass in parliament when opposed by the military-backed members of the Pheu Thai ‘compromise coalition’. Although the weakest in parliamentary strength, the conservative parties benefit from the legacy of nearly nine years of appointments made under Prayut Chan-o-cha, the former army chief who led the 2014 coup d’etat that removed Yingluck Shinawatra. This faction also enjoys the leadership of Prawit Wongsuwan former commander-in-chief of the army, first deputy prime minister and minister of defence under Prayut Chan-o-cha. From this point forward the Pheu Thai Party’s alliance with the conservative monarchy-military establishment, particularly the Bhumjaithai Party, began to unravel. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai told reporters that Thailand had made democratic progress, but “could not rule out” future coups d’état.
In February 2025, tensions flared between Thailand and Cambodia at the Angkorian Ta Moan Thom temple located in the disputed border area adjacent to Thailand’s northeastern Second Army Region under the command of Lt Gen Boonsin Paadklang. General Boonsin was born in the northeastern province of Udon Thani and began his military career in the Second Army Region responsible for protecting areas bordering Cambodia and Laos. He rose through the officer ranks under Prayut Chan-o-cha and Prawit Wongsuwan, attended the Army’s Command and General Staff College with the current Army chief General Phana Khlaeoplotthuk, and has nurtured a high media profile as the ’enforcer’ of Thai sovereignty.
Lt Gen Boonsin was appointed as deputy commander of the 2nd Army Region before being promoted to commander in September 2024. As tensions rose, Boonsin visited a border village, where he thanked “all Thai citizens who love the country” and reassured them that the military would protect Thailand’s sovereignty to “ensure that no territory is lost”. He also ordered shortened operating hours at several checkpoints along the Thai-Cambodian border. The ambitious Lt Gen Boonsin is expected to retire in September 2025 and, like so many high-profile military officers before him, can expect a high-level post in any future military backed Thai government.
The year 2025, was supposed to be a celebration of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Thailand and expected to elevate bilateral cooperation to new highs. On the 23rd April, Paetongtarn Shinawatra met with Prime Minister Hun Manet of Cambodia to celebrate the anniversary of diplomatic relations. Both Hun Manet and Paetongtarn Shinawatra are the children of the former prime ministers of their respective kingdoms and have known each other since childhood. The relationship between Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra had facilitated increasing cooperation bilaterally and trilaterally with Malaysia. Together with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, the three leaders had made steady progress on resolving sovereignty issues and claims over undersea oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Thailand and cooperated on implementing ASEAN’s five-point consensus for peace in Myanmar. The Gulf of Thailand triad were routinely disparaged in Western media as pawns in their narratives about China’s alleged plan for regional hegemony.
While the Thai-Khmer incident sparked a potential crisis for the Thai government, wider regional stability was also under threat from the foreign policies of the second Trump administration. ASEAN Finance ministers had met in in Kuala Lumpur on the 10th of April to discuss a joint plan of action to address external headwinds and serious concern over additional tariffs by the United States and the potential impact on their economies. They noted external trade factors such as slower global growth, contracting international trade, reduced investment flows and risks of heightened volatility in both capital flows and exchange rates, as major challenges for ASEAN states. However, the leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to work constructively with the United States to find balanced, forward-looking solutions and, significantly, to not impose any retaliatory measures in response to the Trump administrations punitive tariffs.They also adopted the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, designed to guide the region's future direction.
On the 26-27 May, with Malaysia as the chair, ASEAN leaders gathered at the 46th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Prior to the summit Malaysia had indicated its interest in joining BRICS and displeasure at the economic and security machinations of the Americans. ASEAN leaders too, were keen to address the disproportionate impact of US tariffs on their economies, disruption of exports, investment deterrence, and strained US-ASEAN trade ties. In particular, the US had imposed punitive tariffs on imports from Cambodia of 49%, Vietnam 46%, Thailand 36%, Malaysia 24% and Singapore 10%. The closing ASEAN statement included commitments to collectively address the ‘weapons for tariff relief’ campaign of the US and commitments to non-proliferation and a non-nuclear ASEAN as well as a pledge to accelerate regional integration and build resilience to external [US] economic shocks.
Whether by coincidence or design, the second Thai-Khmer incident at Chong Bok Pass occurred on the 28th of May one day after the conclusion of the ASEAN summit. While the incident was limited in scope, one Cambodian soldier was killed by Thai forces, it exposed ASEAN’s vulnerability to internal tensions and reignited questions over cohesion and regional security. Border conflict erupted in the early dawn when Thai troops under the command of Lt Gen Boonsin allegedly discovered a 650-metre-long trench, ostensibly dug by Cambodian soldiers, at the disputed Chong Bok Pass area of Ubon Ratchathani province. Phnom Penh accused Thai troops of opening fire first, a claim rejected by the Thai Army.
The incident inflamed nationalist sentiment on both sides of the border, and observers were quick to implicate “calculated provocation by hardline elements within the [Thai] military.” In a widely publicised statement, the Thai army chief, General Phana Khlaeoplotthuk, directed ‘Thai people to stand united' in collectively defending national sovereignty.” Significantly, Lt Gen Boonsin was given responsibility of securing the border following a National Security Council resolution on June 6th. The Thai military, particularly Lt Gen Boonsin, used the Chong Bok Pass incident to paint the Pheu Thai party government as incapable of protecting the country’s borders, which wounded Paetongtarn Shinawatra‘s public image and, significantly, signaled to observers the approach of yet another military coup d’état.
In the wider geopolitical view, the question of who benefits from heightened tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, cannot be overlooked. At the Shangrila security forum held in Singapore two weeks after the second border incident, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth made bellicose claims about security in the so-called Indo-Pacific and specifically an ‘immanent threat’ from China, ostensibly over Taiwan, but also in the South China Sea and all of Southeast Asia. Hegseth exhorted the audience of regional leaders, defence officials, diplomats and policy makers to emulate the Europeans and pledge defence budgets of 5% of GDP – the US devotes 3.5% of GDP to defense. However, his assertion of an “imminent” security threat from “Communist China”, was perceived by the majority of attendees as primarily a demand to purchase American weapons and converge their foreign policies with the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy or face punitive US trade tariffs.
Washington has implicitly tied negotiations over its trade and tariff regime to its China containment strategy. In April 2025, it imposed tariffs of 10% to 50% on its trading partners, which it later suspended for ninety days. For South-east Asian countries, Washington’s deliberate sabotage of WTO mechanisms, cancelled funding for the World Health Organisation (WHO), withdrawal from arms treaties and climate change accords has confirmed that its single minded pursuit of containing China supersedes any previously purported regional security or economic grievances. Hegseth’s bellicose targeting of China and, countries economically linked to it, was not only tone deaf, but lacked validity. All ASEAN member states actively cooperate and openly communicate with China, and they are each other’s largest trade partners. Moreover, the USD25 trillion trade volume of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, surpasses that of all other global trade blocs.
It has not escaped attention in ASEAN capitals that the US is intimately involved in the skirmishes between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea, fragmentation in Myanmar and occasional border tensions between Cambodia and US allies Vietnam and Thailand. Hun Sen’s astute balancing of ‘neutrality’ to absorb Chinese investments while profiting from exports to the US has long-frustrated Washington’s strategy of blocking China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and exerting control over Sihanoukville port and its adjacent Ream naval base in order to dominate the Gulf of Thailand’s exit into the South China Sea. The sudden escalation of tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, also gives credence to the argument that Washington seeks another military coup in Thailand, where the Shinawatra government, that defeated the US backed opposition in the last election, is seen as too friendly with Malaysia, Cambodia and, ultimately, China. The US disruption of regional peace initiatives, including the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea, and assemblage of extra-regional military-technology minilaterals AUKUS and the Quad, are viewed as undermining ASEAN centrality in order to advance its grand strategy of containing China. However, unlike in Europe where the Ukraine war rages or in West Asia where Israel and the US have attacked Iran and are conducting military campaigns in nearly all of the Zionist states neighbours, South-east Asia remains largely peaceful.
The countries of South-east Asia have long-preferred to meet socio-economic priorities such as healthcare and education infrastructure, which wins votes and underpins economic development goals, than meet US demands to militarise their economies justified by hyperbolic incitements about China - their geographic neighbour, cultural kin and largest trade partner. Moreover, the Trump administration’s ‘weapons for tariff relief’ coercion ignores ASEAN’s successful approach to regional peace illustrated by its relatively low defence expenditures. According to a recent survey by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, South-east Asian countries averaged 1.5% of GDP on defence in 2024, a level that has been consistent over the last decade, but lower than the global average of 2.5% of GDP.
When considered in light of the above arguments, the United States’ fraught relationships with both Cambodia and Thailand since its Nixon-era defeat in Vietnam, continues to fester. In Cambodia, the CPP (Cambodian People’s Party), led by Hun Sen for almost 40 years, has successfully navigated US machinations to retain ‘democratic’ power, despite the best efforts of the United States to subvert the country’s government, most notably in the 2014 elections. Thailand, the only ASEAN state to not be completely subordinated during the European, and later American colonial periods, has a long history of military coups d'etat supported by the United States. Whether by coup or political manoeuvring, the US campaign to oust both Hun Manet and Paetongtarn Shinawatra continues unabated.
The 28 May border incident at Chong Bok Pass was followed by public protests and threats of economic and diplomatic retaliation on both sides. Cambodian Senate president and former prime minister Hun Sen released a statement on June 17th demanding Thailand restore normal checkpoint operations to avoid a full border closure and import ban. Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra held a private phone call with Hun Sen on June 18th, which the Cambodian side promptly leaked. Both Hun Sen and Paetongtarn Shinawatra confirmed the authenticity of the leaked audio recording of their phone conversation. According to Hun Sen, the call took place on the evening of June 15, 2025, lasting 17 minutes and 6 seconds, with Phnom Penh Deputy Governor Khleang Huot serving as interpreter. Hun Sen noted that, as is customary for transparency and to avoid any misunderstanding or misrepresentation in official matters, the recording, of which only nine minutes were originally posted publicly, was shared with approximately eighty individuals, including members of the party’s standing committee, Senate working groups, National Assembly teams, the foreign affairs task force, education and outreach units, border affairs groups, and members of the armed forces. “Among these individuals, it is possible that someone disapproved of the Thai Prime Minister.”
In the recording Hun Sen said he was disappointed with the Thai border restrictions that followed the May 28 incident that had sparked the dispute. Shinawatra said she was ready to restore normal border openings. Shinawatra also said that she and Hun Sen “share the same intention of having peace in both countries.” Addressing Hun Sen as “uncle”, Shinawatra said she did not want him “to listen to our opponents, like [Lt Gen Boonsin Paadklang] the commander of the Second Army Region that covers northeastern Thailand, because he is a man of the opponents [conservative monarchy-military elites]. Hun Sen was reportedly angered by the general’s public comment that Thailand was “ready to fight”. Shinawatra replied that “ I don’t want you to be upset or frustrated because actually it is not our intention […] He [Lt Gen Boonsin] wanted to look smart [and] what he said, “was not beneficial to the nation […] actually we want the peace that happened before the clash at the border.”
Shinawatra also apologised for the revelation of a Thai plan to cut off water and electricity to the Cambodian side if the situation deteriorated. She stressed to Hun Sen that these were only plans and were not meant to be executed and proposed the release of a joint statement stating their shared intention to maintain peace. Hun Sen repeated his call for the border crossings to be reopened and Shinawatra agreed, stating that “both countries do so simultaneously so that she would not be accused of doing what others tell her.” She told [Hun Sen] she would discuss the issue with security authorities at Phitsanulok Mansion, the prime ministers official residence.
In her press conference at Government House in Bangkok a few hours later, Shinawatra attempted to defuse criticism explaining that she had tried to calm Hun Sen using an “off-the-record approach in a private conversation”. She denied having released the recording and also denied calling Lt Gen Boonsin her opponent. When asked by a reporter if ties between her family and Hun Sen’s family were over, the prime minister said she personally could not have such a private conversation anymore. “Otherwise, there would be an issue of trust.” Moreover, Shinawatra said that she took the side of the armed forces because she always consulted with them. Lt Gen Boonsin spoke to the prime minister and stated later that he had “informed the prime minister that [he] had no issue with her and that [he] understood her”. However, the leaked conversation had provided sufficient political leverage to convince the conservative-populist Bhumjaithai Party of sixty-nine MP’s to quit the ruling Pheu Thai led coalition.
Left with a slim majority in the 495-member parliament, on the 22nd of July Shinawatra reaffirmed the unity of the remaining coalition partners, including the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party of Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, who retained his position as deputy prime minister and energy minister. However, Thai senate speaker Mongkol Surasajja, viewed as closely associated with the conservative military-monarchist Bhumjaithai Party, formally asked the National Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate the prime minister for alleged gross ethical misconduct over her leaked conversation with Hun Sen. Thus, the Thai Constitutional Court may once again rule to formally remove another [third] Shinawatra prime minister. For her part, Shinawatra has the option to call a snap election, only two years since the last one, but rumours of another military coup d’etat loom ever larger on the horizon.
Meanwhile, Hun Sen explained the Thai-Khmer border tensions in a Telegram post.
“Only extremist groups and some military factions are behind these issues with Cambodia, because as usual, the Thai government is unable to control its military the way our country can.”
On Saturday the 21st of June, Lt Gen Boonsin closed the Chong Sai Taku trade crossing in Buri Ram, citing national security and sovereignty concerns. As the overall commander responsible for the contested border regions he issuedorders [176/2568 and 806/2568] to grant the Suranaree Task Force full control over the opening and closure of all border crossings along the Thai-Cambodian frontier within its jurisdiction. With these two directives the temporary trade crossing was closed indefinitely.
For Cambodia the restrictions on trade and supply chains, resulting from the Thai border incidents and punitive US tariffs, directly threaten its ambitions to become the central supply chain hub between regional industrial and manufacturing powerhouses Vietnam and Thailand. While Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet continues to extol the benefits of investment in the Khmer economy, the country’s [US] export dependent economy has begun to feel the effects of the Trump administrations ‘tariffs for security access’ campaign and complicity in the subversion of the Shinawatra government designed to first politically and economically fragment ASEAN members in order to suborn them to its Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China. For example, solar panel exports, driven by Chinese investments, have dropped from US$415 million to US$3.65 million in less than one year. For many observers, the United States has taken advantage of Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet’s relative inexperience and ‘Western education’ to push for access to Ream naval base, which dominates the Gulf of Thailand, and request resumption of joint military exercises. US success can be witnessed in the response to the Thai crises by Hun Manet’s father, Hun Sen.
On June 20th 2025, Hun Sen released a statement noting that the thirty-year “heartfelt bonds” between his family and that of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra “were shattered by the leak of a phone conversation by a Cambodian official, who was angered by insults directed [at the] Cambodian Prime Minister. For Hun Sen and the CPP, Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s inability to manage disunity within her cabinet, the Thai army and, significantly, the ultra-nationalist movement, has dangerous implications for Cambodia. While the Thai army maintains “conventional disobedience” towards the countries civilian government, ultranationalists such as Sondhi Limthongkul, a Thai media proprietor and pro-Beijing activist, call for an invasion to take Angkor Wat and support the overthrow of the Cambodian government.
On June 20th 2025, PM Shinawatra, accompanied by Lt Gen Boonsin, whom she had disparaged in the leaked phone call with Mr Hun Sen, travelled to an army base near the Cambodian border in a show of support for Thai troops. Her trip came as conservative pro-monarchist groups, including supporters of the “yellow shirt” movement that protested against her father’s government two decades earlier, said they planned to intensify demonstrations demanding her resignation. Moreover, Shinawatra’s visit to the border occurred as her conservative coalition partner United Thai Nation Party was reported as being “poised” to quit the government, which would tip the ruling coalition into a parliamentary minority.
Although Thai military leaders said they wished to de-escalate, officials have threatened to cut electricity and internet to Cambodia’s border towns and both sides imposed restrictions on border crossings. Cambodia stopped imports of Thai fruit and vegetables and banned Thai movies and TV dramas. Cambodia also filed a request with the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) to seek a ruling over the disputed border areas, including the site of the most recent clash. However, Thailand does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction and claims that some areas along the border were never fully demarcated by the colonial era arrangements, including the five ancient Angkorian temple sites.
A few hours after a warning by Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen of an import ban on fruits and vegetables from Thailand, Second Army Area Commander Lt Gen Boonsin Paadklang said he might “propose a reduction in military presence along the border” to ease tensions. Gen Boonsin said the proposal would be made in the Regional Border Committee (RBC) meeting, hosted by the second Army Area on June 27 to 28. Gen Boonsin also said that since the border conflict had commenced the “situation had eased and appeared to be improving” and he would not only propose a reduction in troops, but also the “maintenance of skeleton forces at sensitive areas along the border”. Cambodian PM Hun Manet said that “the solution to the border closure is easy to resolve […] if the Thai army, which unilaterally closed the border crossings on June 7 […] can unilaterally restore the border to its original status.
Ultimately, the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia are tactical steps, within the wider US Indo-Pacific strategy, to exacerbate simmering nationalist sentiments in ASEAN states over regional border and sovereignty disputes. The US long-ago recognised the fratricidal propensity of regional political elites to assimilate US ‘China threat’ narratives in order to gain incremental local and regional political advantages. US narratives are designed to appeal to the vanity and ignorance of narrow interest groups and the conceit and corruption inherent within nationalist agitators. US cultural propaganda perverts ASEAN’s entitled and indulgent youth to assimilate its technological determinist ideology via fantastical Hollywood tales of perpetual victory over rebellious inferior civilisations, ideologies, religions and nations. Moreover, to ensure the fragmentation of ASEAN centrality and advance its dismemberment of China’s southern security flank, the Trump administration’s unelected executive branch officials leverage the ‘security and weapons for tariff relief’ campaign to exert control over bilateral trade and undermine multilateral cohesion. In this way, the United States is able to extract increased defense budget revenue to finance the reanimation of its decayed technology-military-industrial complex. In the final analysis, an increasingly neuralgic and desperate United States is holding ASEAN states ‘hostage’ through intimidation, coercion and, in the case of Cambodia and Thailand, subversion, to sustain its narcissistic ambition of hegemonic renewal - an ambition that requires the fragmentation of ASEAN to debilitate China. As Kissinger famously said, “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal.”
NB: Dr. Wren is chair of Belt and Road Capital Partners, a geopolitical risk, trade and investment, public diplomacy and education partnerships advisory firm with offices in China, Europe, ASEAN, and Australia. Dr. Wren was also the English editor of Hun Sen’s official biography ‘Man of Destiny’ published in 2023. beltandroadcapital@gmail.com
I'm delighted by the statistic shared in this article that ASEAN countries spend far less on their militaries than the global average and hope that outside influence to increase military spending is thwarted.
Very appreciative of the perspective on the dynamics of the current issues facing Thai / Cambodia relations. Thank you.